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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is no question that Americans are growing more and more 
concerned about their weight. 1 One need only glance at the morning 
newspaper to find stories listing the fattest cities in North America2 or 
corresponding articles as to which are the most obese states.3 Also 
adding to this phenomenon are the latest diet crazes. 4 The current 
best seller list is likely to contain at least one book title offering a po-
tentially easy and appetizing way to lose weight.5 Additionally, "high 
protein," "low carbohydrate," "Atkins," and "Sugar Busters" are in-
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1. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick, How We Grew So Big: Diet and Lack of Exercise Are 
Immediate Causes-But Our Problem Began in the Paleolithic Era, TIME,june 7, 2004, at 58, 
61 (analyzing an obese America); Peg Tyre, Fighting 'Big ~at:' An Army is Mobilizing in a 
War Against junk Food; The Combatants: Doctors, Lawyers, Preachers and Moms, NEWSWEEK, 
Aug. 5, 2002, at 38-39 (explaining efforts of various groups to draw attention to the 
harmful effects of 'junk foods"). 
2. See, e.g., Aline McKenzie, Uh-oh: A Bigger D Than Ever, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, 
Jan. 9, 2004, at IE (highlighting a 2003 poll taken by the magazine Men's Fitness, 
which ranks the fattest cities in the country). 
3. See generally id. (showing Texas cities filling five of the top ten spots in an an-
nual list of fattest cities generated by Men's F'itness magazine). 
4. See generally Lisa Chemikoff, Low-Carb Mania: A University of Michigan Expert 
Explains "Why Low-Carb Diets Are Not the Best Choice, AM. FITNESS, May:June 2004, at 45-46 
(discussing the effects of low-carb diet plans). 
5. See, e.g., Wendy Tanaka, On the Strength of a Previous Hit, Rodale Pumped for Next 
"South Beach," PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 10, 2004, at El (discussing the prolifera-
tion of best-selling diet books in the context of the marketing organization created by 
the author of The South Beach Diet). 
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creasingly common terms. 6 Television commercials, as well as 
infomercials, are also contributors to this obsession with weight. 7 
They tout exercise machines, along with memberships to health clubs, 
promising to give all of us the body of AdonisR or the female 
equivalent. 
Adding to the flood of weight-related information swarming at 
consumers are the federal government's labeling requirements for 
packaged food products.9 Labels are required to list calories, protein, 
fat, saturated fats, carbohydrates, cholesterol, sodium, sugar, dietary 
fiber, as well as percentage information for iron, riboflavin, niacin, 
various vitamins, and other ingredients. 10 The medical profession has 
also added its own opinion to the nation's weight obsession by declar-
ing that obesity is now the second largest cause of preventable death 
in the United States. 11 
Many commentators have speculated that the central cause of the 
issue is the American lifestyle. 12 The sit-down family dinner has be-
come a Norman Rockwell fantasy of days long past, 13 and in fact, fast 
6. See Chernikoff, supra note 4; RoBERT C. ATKINS, ATKINS FOR LIFE 8 (2003); H. 
LEIGHTON STEWARD ET AL., THE NEw SuGAR BcsrERS: Ccr SuGAR To TRIM FAT (2003). 
7. See generally Ann-Christine P. Diaz, No Washboard Stomachs in Gym Ad: Crunch 
Ji'itness Continues Quirky Dinxtion to Boost Brand's Attitude, ADVERTISING Ac;E, Nov. 1, 
1999, at 18; Bryan Burrough, Allure ofHome-Fxercise Drvices Sparks Big Sales-and Many 
Injuries, WALL Sr. J., Apr. 16, 1985, § 7, at 33; Active Advertising, SPORTING Goons Bus., 
Feb. 1994, at 112. 
8. See 1 THE :'>JEW ENCYCLOPEDL\ BRITANNICA 105 (15th ed. 2002) (describing Ado-
nis as "a youth of remarkable beauty"). 
9. See generally Food Labeling, 21 C.F.R. §§ 101-101.95 (2004) (explaining the 
general requirements for the labeling of packaged foods meant for human 
consumption). 
10. See generallv 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2004). 
11. See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Improlling Nutri-
tion and Increasing Physical Activity, at http:/ /www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/bb_nutrition/ 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (explaining that obesity is second only to tobacco smoking 
on the list ofpreventab1e deaths); see also RobertJ. Samuelson, The Ajjlictions Of Afflu-
ence, :'>IEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 2004, at 45 (stating that 435,000 lives were lost from smoking 
and 400,000 lives were lost to obesity in a recent year). 
12. See, e.g., Lemonick, supra note 1, at 61-62 (explaining that the Western lifestyle 
is a predominant factor in obesity); see also Traci Watson, What R.eally Plumps You Up: 
The Culprits-Newly Found Genes, Hormones and Flab-Inducing Lifestyles, U.S. NEws & 
WoRw REP., Dec. 12, 1994, at 80 (arguing that" [t]oday's lifestyle, with its labor-saving 
devices and its abundance of what obesity experts call 'highly palatable food,' is per-
fectly calculated to make people fat"). 
13. See Jeffrey Kluger, Why We Eat, TrME, June 7, 2004, at 72, 73 (discussing what 
the author lamented as "the death of the official mealtime" as possibly the biggest 
factor in the obesity epidemic). 
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food has become a mainstay in our diet. 14 While there is no intention 
to single out McDonald's contribution to the obesity problem, there is 
little question that the Big Mac and the company's logo the so-called 
"Golden Arches," have become two of the primary images associated 
with fast food consumption. 15 The fact remains, however, that regard-
less of who sells f~1ttening food, to many people it has a certain allure 
over food which is bland.16 
As of December 2004, there was only one case where plaintiffs 
sought to recover damages for obesity allegedly caused by fast food 
consumption. 17 The trial judge in that case dismissed the lawsuit 
before the discovery phase could begin, and the suit was later revived 
at the appellate level. lR So the question remains: can fattening food 
be considered defective under products liability law? In other words, 
if we use McDonald's Big Mac as a symbol for fast food consumption, 
can we hold it liable for America's problem with obesity? 
14. See Amanda Spake, How McNuggets Changed the World, U.S. NEws & WoRLD 
RF.r.,Jan. 22, 20<)1, at 54 (explaining that "[o]n any given day, about one quarter of 
U.S. adults visit a fast-food restaurant"); ERIC ScHLOSSER, E\sT Foon NATIO:'-i (2002) 
("Americans now spend more money on fast food than on higher education, personal 
computers, computer software, or new cars. They spend more on fast food than on 
movies, books, magazines, newspapers, videos, and recorded music-combined."). 
15. See Daniel Eisenberg, Can McDonald~5 Shape Up?, TIME, Sept. 30, 2002, at 52 
(noting that McDonald's opens a new restaurant somewhere around the globe every 
eight hours); Stephen Koepp, Big Mac Strikes Back: Burger Dashers, Watch Out' l'vlcDon-
ald~5!5 on a Roll, TIME, Apr. 13, 1987, at 58, 59 (quoting a professor of anthropology 
who said, "[Y]ou can hardly spend a day without seeing a golden arch"). 
16. See Matthew Boyle, Can You Really Make Fast Food flealthy ?, FoRTUNE, Aug. 9, 
2004, at 134, 136-37 (discussing fast-food restaurants' failed attempts to sell healthier 
food and quoting Janice Meyer, an analyst, who said, "A lot of companies were chas-
ing the nutritional content and not the taste bud."); see also Richard A. Lovett, How 
Your Brain Plays with Food, PsYCHOL. ToDAY, Julv-Aug. 2004, at 18 (explaining studies 
where food color and presentation factored into consumption amounts). 
17. See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., No. 02 CTV. 7821 (RWS), 20m WL 22052778, 
at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing plaintiffs' claim against McDonald's because of 
their failure to make "explicit allegations that they witnessed any particular deceptive 
advertisement [and because they did not provide] McDonald's with enough informa-
tion to determine whether its products [were] the cause of the alleged injuries"); rev'd 
and remanded by 396 F.3d 508 (2nd Cir. 2005) (holding that the case was improperly 
dismissed by the district court because this information "is appropriately the scope of 
discovery" under the notice pleading requirements of FEn. R. C1v. P. H(a)). 
18. See 396 F.3d 508 (reviving the lawsuit and noting that the trial judge did not 
expressly state that there was not a conceivable cause of action against McDonald's, 
rather he based his dismissal on the fact that the plaintiffs had failed to properly 
plead their case under New York law). 
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II. THE TEST FOR DEFECTIVENESS 
American jurisprudence has always held purveyors of defective 
foods liableY" Over the years this liability has been imposed under 
theories of strict liability, actionable negligence, 20 and/ or an implied 
warranty offitness.21 The trend continued when strict products liabil-
ity, the focal point of this article, came into prominence during the 
1960s.22 
The latter is perhaps the most plaintiff.friendly cause of action, 
simplifying the requirements of a cause of action. Most jurisdictions 
require the product to be defective, require the plaintiff to prove the 
defective condition caused the plaintiffs injury, and the product must 
have been in a defective condition at the time the defendant seller 
placed it into the stream of commerce.23 The law on the requirement 
of defectiveness is quite clear. Our system of jurisprudence will not 
impose absolute liabilit-y upon the seller of goods.24 To do so would 
19. See, e.g., Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12Johns. 468 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (holding the 
seller of beef strictly liable for failing to disclose that the cow had been diseased prior 
to slaughter); Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Tmts Section 402A. and the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REv. 713, 736-37 (1970) (noting American courts 
came to the early conclusion that the justification for the food warranties was not 
based in contract, but rather on policy); s Pe also David G. Owen, Manufacturing DPfects, 
S3 S.C. L. R~<:v. 851, 886 (2002) (indicating that early English statutes criminalized the 
sale of unwholesome food and drink sold for immediate consumption). 
20. See, e.g., Drury v. Armour & Co., 216 S.W. 40, 41-42 (Ark. 1919) (stating that a 
plaintiff who consumes unwholesome food products can proceed under a negligence 
recovery theory); Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co., 167 A. 99 (Conn. 1933) (stating that "re-
covery can be had based upon negligence in the preparation and service of food and 
drink in a hotel or restaurant"); Dickens v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 209 A.2d 169, 
171 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965) (stating the rule that the presence of a foreign substance in 
food creates a presumption of negligence). 
21. See Heise v. Gillette, 149 N.E. 182, 183 (Ind. App. 1925) (stating that there is 
an implied warranty that food is wholesome); Stewart v. Martin, 181 S.W.2d 657, 658 
(Mo. 1944) (stating that the sale of unwholesome food would impose absolute liability 
on the seller for breaching the implied warranty of fitness); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Fergu-
son, 60 S.W.2d 817, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (holding that an implied warranty of 
fitness accompanies the sale of food for immediate consumption). 
22. See William E. Westerbeke, The Sources of Controversy in the New Restatement of 
Products Liability: Strict Liability Versus Products Liability, 8 KAN. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 1, 6 
(Fall 1998) (asserting that section 402A at its inception was intended to address the 
traditional barriers to recoverv, but it expanded through interpretations to the entire 
field of products liability). 
23. See, e.g., 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN AND OwEr-; ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 5:3 (3d ed. 2000). 
24. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 879 (Alaska 1979) 
(enunciating the rule that strict liability is not absolute liability); Fibreboard Corp. v. 
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make the seller an insurer.25 Instead we utilize strict products liability, 
and the cornerstone of this cause of action requires a product, or 
food, to be in a defective condition.26 Considering that any product 
can cause injury, 27 and no product is technologically perfect, the im-
portance of creating a test that determines this condition becomes 
clear. It became clear early on that any product could be defective if 
it was mismanufactured, 28 mis-marketed, 29 or mis-designed;~'0 al-
though the test is different in each instance. 
A. Mismanufactured 
Unlike other areas of products liability litigation, the test for de-
fectiveness where food has been mismanufactured has remained fairly 
constant.31 In this instance, the manufacturer has placed the product 
Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1175 (Colo. 1993) (stating that strict liability is not absolute 
liability). 
25. See, e.g., Carlin v. Super. Ct. (Upjohn Co.), 920 P.2d 1347, 1349-50 (Cal. 1996) 
(stating that the manufacturer does not become an insurer under strict liabilitv); Er-
nest W. Hahn, Inc., v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1979) (noting that 
under strict liability, the manufacturer does not become an insurer). 
26. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861, 864 (Ariz. 1995) (stat-
ing that to make a prima facie case of strict liability, the plaintiff must show that the 
product was defective when it left the defendant's control); O'Mara v. Dykema, 942 
S.W.2d 854, 858 (Ark. 1997) (stating that the product must be in a defective condition 
that is unreasonably dangerous in order to sustain a cause of action f{>r strict products 
liability). 
27. Virtually any product can cause an injury and thus give rise to strict products 
liability. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Parker Feeders, Inc., 547 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1976) (dis-
cussing cattle feeders); Collins v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 315 N.E.2d 670 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1974) (discussing ladders); Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 
1977) (discussing golf carts). 
28. See, e.g., 1 OwEN, supra note 23, at § 7:1 (explaining that a product with a 
manufacturing defect is "mismanufactured," meaning it varies from the manufac-
turer's standards or blueprints and this variance causes the product to become dan-
gerous or unfit for its intended use). 
29. See id. at§ 9:1 (explaining that a manufacturer's failure to give the consumer 
adequate information about the hazards of using the product may also give rise to a 
claim under strict liability; and that the most common claims center around whether 
the product was accompanied by adequate warnings and instructions). 
30. See id. at§ 8:1 (explaining that a comprehensive definition of defective design 
does not exist, but cases involving defective design questions generally evaluate the 
safety and effectiveness of products as they were intended to be manufactured and 
used by the public). 
31. One of two primary tests is the foreign/natural test which puts the primary 
focus on whether the object is natural to the foodstuff in which it was found. See infra 
notes 34-36. The other predominant test is the reasonable expectation test, which 
creates a fact question as to whether a consumer would reasonably expect to find such 
a substance in his or her food. If the consumer would reasonably expect to find such 
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into the stream of commerce in a condition that the manufacturer did 
not intend.32 It is different from the rest of the defendant's produc-
tion because of the alleged defective qualities, or defective substance, 
in question."3 In scenarios involving food, the courts at first adhered 
to the so-called foreign/natural test. 34 Under this theory, the initial 
question was if the disputed substance was natural to the product, 
such as a fragment of a shell in a pecan pie, 35 or if it was foreign, such 
a substance, then the seller or manufacturer is not liable; conversely, if a consumer 
would not reasonably expect to find such a substance, then the seller or manufacturer 
is liable. See infra note 61. 
32. See 1 OWEN, supra note 23, at ~ 7.1 (defining a manufacturing defect as "an 
aberration that may affect only a single product," caused by noncompliance to the 
manufacturer's blueprints or plans creating a flaw that makes the product more dan-
gerous and unfit for use. "In other words, the product with a manufacturing defect is 
mismanufactured.") 
33. See generally Reichert Milling Co. v. George, 162 So. 393 (Ala. 1935) (finding a 
decomposed rat in flour used to make biscuits); Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 161 A. 
385 (Conn. 1932) (finding that a consumer swallowed and ate food which contained 
particles of a can); Robinson v. ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 478 A.2d 265 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1984) (finding that a consumer ingested a cupcake that contained a piece of glass); 
Halem v. Wagner Baking Co., 184 N.Y.S.2d. 54 ("J.Y. City Ct. 19!'i9) (stating that a 
consumer bit into a stone while eating pie). 
34. See, e.g., Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 59 P.2d 144, 148 (Cal. 1936) (coming to 
the conclusion that objects not intended to be includt"cl in foods but are natural deriv-
atives of foods, such as bone slivers in ground meat or cherry pits in cherry pie, are 
natural and absolve the vendor of liability for selling the product). See alsoJane Mas-
sey Draper, Annotation, Liability for Injury or Death Allegedly Caused by Food Product Con-
taining Object Related To, But Not Intended to be Present In, Product, 2 A.L.R. 5th 189 
(1992) (highlighting the nature of the f<Jreign/natural test). This initial test deter-
mined "liability for injuries caused by objects in food which are natural and related to 
the food but not intended to be in the food." !d. at§ 2[a]. 
The test creates liability, on the basis of breach of an implied warranty of 
wholesomeness and reasonable fitness for human consumption, for the ven-
dor of food containing a foreign object which injures a consumer, but ab-
solves the vendor where the object is natural to the food, since the presence 
of the natural object does not render the food unwholesome, nor, on the 
premise that a consumer is not entitled to expect perfect food, does it 
render the food not reasonably fit for human consumption. With regard to 
negligence, this test requires a consumer to act upon common knowledge 
that certain food products may contain natural parts of the ingredients, al-
beit not intended to be in the final product . . . . Id. 
35. Ser Jackson v. Nestle-Beich, Inc., !'i89 N.E.2d !'i47 (Ill. 1992); see also Ford v. 
\1iller Meat Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (discovering a bone frag-
ment in ground beef); Porteous v. St. Ann's Cafe & Deli, 713 So. 2d 4!'i4 (La. 1998) 
(discoveiing a pearl in a raw oyster); Mitchell v. T.G.I. Friday's, 748 N.E.2d 89 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2000) (discovering a clam shell in fried clam strips); Williams v. Braum Ice 
Cream Stores, Inc., !'i34 P.2d 700 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (discovering a cherry pit in 
cherry ice cream). 
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as a piece of glass in a bar of candy. 36 The test was perhaps too simple 
and led to some inequitable results when, for example, a plaintiff with 
a broken or chipped tooth brought about by a cherry pit in cherry ice 
creamg7 or by a sliver of bone in a hamburger3H was left without a 
remedy. 39 
As a result, this test soon gave way to the newer, and almost uni-
versally accepted, reasonable expectations test. 40 In this scenario, the 
jury is asked to answer the following question of fact: would the ordi-
nary user or consumer reasonably expect to find the substance in 
question in his or her food? 41 If the answer is yes, by definition the 
36. See Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 141 So. 762 (Miss. 1932); see also Hickman v. 
WM. Wrigley, .Jr. Co., 768 So. 2d 812 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (finding a metal screw in 
chewing gum); CEF Enters. v. Betts, 838 So. 2d 999 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (finding 
insect-contaminated food); Cohen v. Allendale Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 351 S.E.2d 
897 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (discovering a dead insect in a bottle of soda). 
37. See Williams 534 P.2d at 70 I. 
38. See Brown v. Nebiker, 296 N.W. 366, 371 (Iowa 1941). 
39. See Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Mass. 1964) 
(determining that when sitting down for a bowl of fish chowder, one can reasonably 
anticipate and guard against finding a fish bone); Adams v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 
112 S.E.2d 92, 98 (N.C. 1960) (concluding that a consumer can he expected to antici-
pate a crystallized grain of corn in a hox of corn flakes); Allen v. Grafton, 164 r-<. E.2d 
167, 175 (Ohio 1960) (holding that a small piece of shell in a fried oyster is natural 
and can be reasonably anticipated). 
40. See, e.g., :VIexicali Rose v. Superior Ct., R22 P.2d 1292, 1302-04 (Cal. 1992) 
(changing California law from the foreign/natural test to one of reasonable expecta-
tion). The Mexicali test changed the foreign/natural test from one which focuses on 
the nature of the object in the food to a test of whether a customer could reasonably 
expect to find the object in the food. Id. at 1302. The reasonable expectation test 
diilers from the foreign/natural test mainly in that (1) it is a question of fact as to 
whether the injurious substance is to be anticipated and (2) the focus is not on the 
components of the dish hut rather on the completed product, considering the nature 
of the dish and the nature of it~ preparation. !d. The difference between the two 
tests only comes into play when the object in the food is "natural" to the food. No 
instant strict liability exists but rather a question of fact as to whether the consumer 
could reasonably expect to find the object. Id. at 1303-04. See alm Langiulli v. Bum-
ble Bee Seafood, Inc., 604 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (abolishing the 
foreign/natural test in favor of the reasonable expectation test); Betehia v. Cape Cod 
Corp., 103 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Wis. 1960) (stating that the test for whether food is defec-
tive is if the consumer reasonably expected the foreign object, not whether the object 
was merely foreign or natural). 
41. Compare Ex parte Morrison's Cafeteria of Montgomery, Inc., 431 So. 2d 975, 979 
(Ala. 1983) (holding that a consumer may reasonably expect to find a fish hone in a 
fish fillet), with Johnson v. So. Pac. Canning Co., 580 So. 2d 556, 558 (La. Ct. App. 
1991) (stating that a fish eye lens in a can of tuna was not natural and not reasonably 
expected by consumers), Phillips v. West Springfield, 540 N.E.2d 1331, 1333 (Mass. 
l9R9) (noting that a high school student may or may not reasonably expect to find a 
turkey bone in a school-provided lunch), Ruvolo v. Homovich, 778 N.E.2d 661, 663 
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food is not in a defective condition, and if the answer is no, then the 
food is in a defective condition. Mismanufactured food disputes are 
fascinating; however, they are not within the realm of our primary dis-
cussion. We are more concerned with foodstuff that contains a high 
degree of fat or other fattening substances. The inclusion of these 
fattening ingredients is intended by the manufacturer and, as a result, 
this raises the separate issue of whether a product has been mis-mar-
keted and/ or mis-designed. 
B. Mis-Marketed 
A product is mis-marketed when there has been a failure to issue 
adequate warnings or instructions about the use or consumption of 
the product.42 A product is mis-designed when all of the parts or in-
gredients have been planned and are intended to be part of the goods 
as ultimately introduced into the stream of commerce. Adequate 
warnings deal with the safe use of a product,4 " and adequate instruc-
(Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (stating that a restaurant customer should reasonably expect to 
find a chicken bone in a chicken sandwich), and Jefferies v. Clark's Rest. Enter., 580 
P.2d 1103, 1104 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that whether a patron reasonably ex-
pected crab shell in a crab sandwich is a question for the jury). See also Draper, supra 
note 34 (discussing the differences between the foreign/natural and reasonable ex-
pectation test). 
42. See, e.g., Chandler v. Gene Messer Ford, Inc. 81 S.W.3d 493, 504 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2002) (listing the elements that a plaintiff must prove to recover under a defective 
warning theory). Chandler states that to recover for a mis-marketed product, a plain-
tiff must prove: 1) a risk of harm is inherent in the product or may arise from the 
intended or reasonably anticipated use of the product; 2) the product supplier actu-
ally knew or should have reasonably foreseen the risk of harm at the time the product 
was marketed; 3) the product must possess a marketing defect; 4) the absence of a 
warning or instructions renders the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer of the product; 5) the existence of a causal nexus between the failure to 
warn or instruct and the user's injury. Id. at 504; cf REsTATEME:--.IT (SECOND) OF ToRTS 
§ 402A cmt. ( 1965) (explaining that a seller "may be required to give directions or 
warning on the container as to its use") ;JAMES A. HENDERSON,JR. AND AARoN D. TWER-
SKI, PRODUCTS LIABILIIY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS (5th ed. 1994) (stating that a majority 
of marketing defect~ occurs when the manufacturer fails to give adequate warnings 
and instructions). 
43. See, e.g., Radiation Tech., Inc. v. Ware Constr. Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 
1983) (stating that a product can be defective due to inadequate instructions and 
warnings regarding safe use); Robinson v. Williamsen Idaho Equip. Co., 498 P.2d 
1292, 1300 (Idaho 1972) (explaining that instructions on "safe operation" alone may 
not qualify as adequate warnings); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 15 (Md. 1975) 
(stating that a manufacturer has a duty to produce a safe product and provide ade-
quate warnings and instructions). 
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tions deal with its corresponding effective use.44 American jurispru-
dence has decreed that this information must be adequate,1 " and 
courts have interpreted "adequate" to mean that (1) the information 
in question must reach the ultimate user or consumer,46 (2) the con-
sumer must notice the information,47 (3) and most importantly, the 
information must penetrate the consumer's mind.48 In other words, 
44. See Anderson v. Nissei ASB Mach. Co., 3 P.3d 1088, 1093 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) 
(holding that a jury could have inferred that poor instructions for safe use of the 
product in question could have rendered it defective); Armentrout v. F:\1C Corp., 
842 P.2d 175, 180 (Colo. 1992) (stating that a product can be defective if accompa-
nied by inadequate instructions for use); Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 
N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. App. Ct. 1997) (stating that duty to warn consists of two duties, 
the duty to provide instructions for safe use and the duty to warn of potential dangers 
of improper use). 
45. See, e.g., Hubbard-Hall Chern. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 404 (I st Cir. 
1965) (stating that an adequate warning is one that would indicate to a reasonably 
prudent person the nature and extent of the danger that the product offers); see also 
M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the 
Lenses of Corrective .Justice and Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REv. 1017, 1056 (1998) (defining an 
adequate warning as one that must "by its size, location, and intensity of language or 
symbol, be calculated to impress upon a reasonably prudent user of the product the 
nature and extent of the hazard involved"). 
46. See, e.g., Byrne v. SCM Corp., 538 N.E.2d 796, 811 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (stating 
that instructions and warnings may be insufficient if they fail to reach the foreseeable 
users); Hoffman v. E.W. Bliss Co., 448 N.E.2d 277, 283 (Ind. 1983) (stating that the 
manufacturer has a duty to provide warnings and instructions that will reach the end 
consumer). 
47. See generally Richards v. Urjohn Co., 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) 
(stating that "the manufacturer must bring the warning home" to the user);James B. 
Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARv's L.]. 
521, 559 ( 1982) (asserting that a proper warning is one that conveys "the warning in 
such a manner as to assure that a user's attention will be attracted"). 
48. Courts appear to have much faith in the American consumer. See, e.g., Mila-
nowicz v. The Raymond Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d. 525,528 (D.NJ. 2001) (incorporating 
a presumption that a warning that is given will be heeded and followed); Lee v. Mar-
tin, 45 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Ark Ct. App. 2001) (agreeing that there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that consumers will read and follow safety instructions); Nissen Trampoline 
Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'! Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) 
(agreeing that a rebuttable presumption exists in favor of the manufacturer); USX 
Corp. v. Salinas, 818 S.W.2d 473, 484 n.l3 (Tex. App. 1991) (stating that there is a 
well-established presumption that an injured party will read and heed a proper warn-
ing if one is given). The presumption referred to in Martin and Nissen Trampoline is 
clearly rebuttable if it can be shown that even adequate warnings would have been a 
futile effort. See Martin, 45 S.W.3d at 865. Other courts have taken the position that 
an inadequate warning is no warning and thus dismiss the need for the plaintiff to 
prove causation between the inadequate warning and plaintiffs injury. See, e.g., 
Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 1962) (opining that the effect 
of an inadequate warning is no warning at all). 
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in products liability disputes the information must have been deliv-
ered to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must pay have paid attention to 
it. 
Mter some trial and error, it was finally decided that the best test 
for determining defects in these scenarios would be to use the so-
called risk/benefit analysis. 49 It is expressed as PL(G)>B=D, which 
means that if the probability (P) of loss (L) multiplied by the gravity 
of the iruury (G) is greater than the burden (B) of reducing or elimi-
nating that risk, then the court will find that the product is in a defec-
tive condition (D).50 The opposite formula is also true. If the jury 
determines that the burden is greater than the probability of loss mul-
tiplied by the gravity of the injury, then the jury will find that the prod-
uct is not in a defective condition.51 The formula is appropriate for 
49. See Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 469 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that 
adequate warnings must be considered in balancing the risks of a product); 
Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Colo. 1993) (discussing the risk/ 
benefit test as a method of determining whether a product is defective due to poor 
marketing); Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chern. Corp., 7 P.3d 795, 807 (Wash. 2000) (stat-
ing that "[m] ost courts agree that, for the liability system to be fair and efficient, the 
balancing of risks and benefits in judging product design and marketing must be 
done in light of the knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably at-
tainable at the time of distribution"); see generally A.D. Twerski eta!.. The Use and Abuse 
ol Warnings in Products Liability-Design Difect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 495,514 (1976) (describing the balancing test for defectiveness based on design 
as the weighing of probability and gravity of the harm versus the cost of warning the 
user of the harm); W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 
AM. U. L. REv. 573, 575 (1990) (stating that the risk/benefit test is generally applica-
ble when (1) analyzing a physical design to determine, for example, if a safety devices 
is warranted; (2) analyzing the need for hazard warnings; and (3) determining 
whether the product should be marketed at all). 
50. See Charles E. Cantu, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability in Tort from Strir:t 
Products Liability: Medusa Unveiled, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 823, 872-73 (2003) (offering 
additional explanations of the formula); see also Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 
P.2d 1240, 1247-48 (Colo. 1987) (enunciating the factors to consider in determining 
whether a product's benefits are outweighed by its risks); Bryant v. Hoffmann-La 
Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer will be relieved of liability only upon a showing that ( 1) the product was 
properly manufactured and contained adequate warnings; (2) the benefits out-
weighed the risks; and (3) it was impossible to make the product safer). 
51. See, e.g., Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 70-74 (1st Cir. 
2002) (holding that the utility of an airbag exceeded its risk); Williams v. Briggs Co., 
62 F.3d 703, 706-07 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that the design of a thermostat was not 
unreasonably dangerous under the risk/benefit analysis simply because it could heat 
to 170 degrees, because an ordinary person was capable of avoiding the danger 
presented by the thermostat); Burks v. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 633 F.2d 
1152, 1155-56 (5th Cir. 1981) (affirming the district court's decision to allow thejurv 
to use the risk/benefit test to conclude that a tire rim was not defective). 
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settling questions of whether a product is defective in its marketing or 
design. Unlike a product that has been mismanufactured, the manu-
facturer in these cases intended to introduce the product into the 
stream of commerce in its present form, and a finding of defective-
ness will condemn the manufacturer's entire line of production.52 
The plaintiff's burden in a mis-marketing case is to establish that 
the marketing of the product was defective because an additional 
warning or instruction would have eliminated the risk of the injury 
sustained.53 At first impression it appears that, as result of this stan-
dard, all products would be defective. 54 How much of a burden could 
an additional warning or instruction be? The result of PL(G) would 
always be greater than the burden of issuing one more item of infor-
mation. An analysis of the cases, however, establishes that if the man-
ufacturer warns of all possible risks, then we will ultimately reach the 
52. See James A. Henderson, Jr. et al., Restatement Third, Torts: Products Liabili(v: 
What Hath the ALI Wrought?, 64 DEF. CouNs.J. 501, 506 (1997) (explaining that when 
a product is found to be defective due to mis-design or inadequate warnings, the 
manufacturer's entire product line is condemned); Thomas C. Bigosinski, Constitu-
tional Law-Preemption and Products Liability-Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act Ht:ld Not to Preempt State Common I.aw Damage Artions-Cipollone v. Liggett GroufJ, 
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992), 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 1791, 1796 n.l9 (1993) (stating 
that omission of the duty to warn is grouped with design defects and thus may render 
an entire line of products defective); James T. O'Reilly, Product Recalls & The Thml 
&statement: Consumers Lose Twice from Defects in Products and in the Restatement Itself, 33 
U. ME'\1. L. REv. 883, 886 (2003) (stating that a design defect renders an entire line of 
products defective, while a warning defect may render the labels or packages 
defective). 
53. See gerlf'mlly George W. Flynn &John]. Laravuso, The kxistence of a Duty to Warn: 
A Question for the Court or the jury?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 633 (2000); see also 
George W. Soule & Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to Wam in Minnesota, the New Restate-
ment on Products Liability, and the Application of the REasonable Care Standard, 21 WM. 
MncHELL L. REv. 389, 407-08 (1995) (stating that in a failure-to-warn case, the plain-
tiff must prove that the defendant's lack of instructions caused the plaintiffs injuries); 
J. David Tate, Comment, The American Law Institute Study on f-'nterprise Liability for Per-
sonal Injury: How Does Texas Tmt Law Compare?, 45 BAYLOR L. REv. 103, Ill (1993) 
(stating a plaintiff must prove that "when a product is defective due to inadequate 
labeling, the warning (or lack thereof) must be a producing cause of the injury"). 
54. See, e.g., Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A2d l1, 15 (Md. 1975) (noting that when 
engaging in a cost/benefit test, the cost of giving adequate warnings i~ usuallv so 
minimal that the balance will almost always weigh in favor of an obligation to warn of 
Iaten t dangers); see also Charles E. Can Hi, Distinguishing the Concept of Strict Liability for 
Ultra-Hazardous Activities from Strict Products Liability Under Section 402A of the RPstatement 
(Second) of Torts: Two Parallel Lines of Reasoning That Should Never Meet, 35 AKRON L. 
REv. 31, 51-53 (2001) (stating that at first glance, under the risk/benefit test, the 
burden of placing an extra warning on a label will always be outweighed by the 
probability and magnitude of harm; however, a point of diminishing returns pre-
cludes warnings for all possible dangers). 
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point of "warnings pollution."55 Pity the poor manufacturer! If they 
issue too much information, we will effectively reach a point of dimin-
ishing returns.56 The consumer will more than likely ignore volumi-
nous amounts of data. 57 On the other hand, if the manufacturer fails 
to inform a user of a risk, and a jury subsequently determines the risk 
was foreseeable, the manufacturer will be held responsible for having 
introduced a defective product into the stream of commerce. 58 The 
resulting confusion is not satisfactory. We can, at best, only offer man-
ufacturers guidelines. 
Fortunately, our focus is not on whether a product is defective 
because it has been mis-marketed. The high content of fat and fatten-
55. See Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d 608, 611 (4th 1999) (explaining that 
information overload may render a product as defective as insufficient information); 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 509 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1993) (recognizing that "excessive warnings on product labels may be counter-
productive, causing 'sensory overload' that literally drowns crucial information in a 
sea of mind-numbing detail"); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. 
RE\'. 265 ( 1990); Twerski, supra note 49 at 514-17 (mentioning the actual cost of addi-
tional warnings and contending that a marketing plan that informs the consumer of 
all possible risks of a particular product is simply not feasible). 
56. SPe, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics Co., 509 N.W.2d 
520, 523 (noting that Michigan courts have consistently held that "sensory overload" 
may occur if a manufacturer provides an encyclopedia of warnings); Twerski, supra 
note 49 at 514-17 (offering a discussion of the hazards of "crying wolf' and cautioning 
that excessive warnings may be counterproductive); see also Cantu, supra note 54, at 
53-54 (noting that case law and jurisprudence recognize that information overload 
does not solve the adequacy of the warning dilemma). 
57. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 592 A.2d 1176, 1200 (NJ. 1991) (noting 
that the FDA has acknowledged the possibility of information overload with regard to 
prescription medication); Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671 N.E.2d 252, 258 (Ohio 1996) 
(explaining that the FDA requires that only information concerning known hazards 
should be included and warned about); Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 
797 P.2d 527, 534 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (realizing that the possibility of information 
overload may cause consumers to pay less attention to warnings on labels); see also 
Mark Geistfeld, inadequate Product Warnings and Causation, 30 U. Mrcu.]. L. REFORM 
309, 322-27 (1997) (recognizing that people will stop reading warnings if the warn-
ings disclose risks that are easily observed and recognized by the average consumer; in 
other words, the average consumer is concerned with material disclosures). 
58. See Anguiano v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 808 F. Supp. 719, 722 (D. 
Ariz. 1992) (noting that strict liability may impose liability on a manufacturer for plac-
ing a product into the stream of commerce without adequate instructions); Anderson 
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 553-54 (Cal. 1991) (noting that a 
manufacturer can be held liable for placing a product into the stream of commerce 
without adequate warnings); Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 627 A.2d 1347, 1353 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 1993) (applying a Connecticut statute, which holds a product seller liable for sell-
ing a product without adequate warnings and instructions). 
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ing substances in fast food is becoming common knowledge. The very 
information mentioned in the introductory part of this article would 
indicate that the American public is becoming more informed of this 
fact, and as a result, fast food companies would be absolved of any 
duty or obligation to warn. Judicial opinions are quite clear that there 
is no duty to warn of an obvious or known risk. 59 
With regard to our discussion, a strong argument can be made 
that food products known to be fattening need not carry such a warn-
ing. Perhaps the most that could or should be required is that the fast 
food industry follow the same course of action required of manufac-
turers of pre-packaged food, and list the representative ingredients in 
their foods along with the corresponding amount of calories per serv-
ing.b0 Making this information easily available would satisfY the rea-
sonably prudent consumer as to the contents of the food and the 
corresponding fattening qualities. If fast food is not likely to be found 
defective from a mismanufactured or mis-marketed litigation perspec-
tive, the question remains whether it could or should be considered 
defective because it has been mis-designed. 
C. Mis-Designed 
Mis-designed signifies that all of the ingredients, or rather the 
entire image of the product, have been consciously intended by the 
manufacturer.G 1 A mis-designed product, like one which has been 
mis-marketed, is different from a mismanufactured product in three 
ways. First, the various tests for determining defectiveness of a prod-
uct under a mis-designed analysis are different.b02 Second, a mis-de-
signed product is introduced into the stream of commerce in a 
condition intended by the manufacturer;G3 and third, a finding of de-
59. See, e.g., Tillman v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., R71 So.2d 2R, 32 (Ala. 2003) 
(stating that manufacturers will not be held liable for defective products that possess 
patent and obvious dangers); Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 667 P.2d 750, 756 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 19R3) (finding that a defect was so obvious that the manufacturer had no 
obligation to warn). 
60. Cf 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (j) (2004) (exempting restaurants from the requirements 
for disclosing the ingredients and nutritional information related to the foods they 
sell). 
61. See I OwEN, supra notes 23, at§ 7:1. 
62. Various tests have been utilized when determining whether a product is defec-
tive due to mis-design. See, e.g., 63A AM . .JuR. 2d §§ 938-87 (1997) (identih•ing various 
analytical methods for determining design defects including the risk/utility test, the 
consumer expectation test, the reasonably prudent manufacturer test, the unreasona-
bly dangerous test, and the unreasonable risk of harm test). 
6:). See, e.g., Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Colo. 1987) (not-
ing that in design-defect or failure-to-warn cases, the product has been manufactured 
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fectiveness will condemn the defendant's entire line of production.64 
Perhaps it is for this last reason that our judicial system struggled for 
so long to create an effective standard for this type of defect. 65 The 
standard which ultimately emerged as the prevailing test for defec-
tively designed goods is, again, the so-called risk/benefit analysis. 66 
The same formula of probability (P) of loss (L) times the gravity 
of injury (G) being compared to the burden (B) of reducing or elimi-
nating that risk is used.67 If the burden (B) of reducing or eliminat-
ing the risk is greater than the sum of the first three factors, the 
product is not defective. If the opposite is true, then the product is 
defective. The burden in this instance, however, is more complex 
than the burden in a mis-marketing analysis.68 The burden in a mis-
design case involves presenting feasible alternatives for the product.69 
exactly as intended); Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 761 A.2d 477, 481 (N.H. 2000) 
(defining a design defect as one which is manufactured in conformity with the in-
tended design). 
64. See, e.g., Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 589 P.2d 896, 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) 
(stating that a design defect renders an entire product line defective); Banks v. ICI 
Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) (determining that when a product is defec-
tively designed, the entire line of products is called into question); Pre ntis v. Yale Mfg. 
Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 185 (Mich. 1984) (concluding that the finding of liability on a 
defective-design theory condemns an entire line); Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 
P.2d 54, 60 (N.M. 1995) (agreeing with other jurisdictions that a design defect affects 
the entire product line); see also Michelle Capezza, Comment, Controlling Guns: A Call 
for Consistency in Judicial Review of Challenges to Gun Control Legislation, 25 SETON HAI L 
L. lh:Y. 1467, 1486 n.65 (1995) (asserting that when a product is mis-designed, "every 
one of the products represents a potential lawsuit against the manufacturer"). 
65. Compare Brady, 589 P.2d at 900 (contemplating the nature of the test that is 
used f(Jr design defects and the recognition of expansive ramifications) with Banks, 
450 S.E.2d at 673-74 (explaining the search for a design-defect test) and Brooks, 902 
P.2d at 60 (rejecting the Prentis logic of holding a plaintiff to a higher threshold). 
66. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1221 n.l5 (Alaska 
1998) (noting that most jurisdictions rely on the risk/utility test rather than the con-
sumer expectation test in cases of design defect); Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
764 N.E.2d 35, 41-42 (Ill. 2002) (noting that a risk/benefit analysis is embedded 
within a design-defect analysis); Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 165 
(Iowa 2002) (noting that the risk/benefit test used in design-defect cases is the same 
as the one employed in negligence cases). 
67. See supra note 49-52 and accompanying text. 
68. To recover for a manufacturing defect or a marketing defect, plaintiffs must 
only demonstrate that they were injured because of a defect in one product or that 
they were misinformed and not allowed to protect themselves; however, in a design-
defect case, plaintiffs must also offer an alternative design. See infra notes 69-73 and 
accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1479 (lOth Cir. 1993) (noting that 
without evidence of a feasible alternative design, the jury question of design defect is 
inappropriate); Barton v. Adams Rental, Inc., 938 P.2d 532, 537 (Colo. 1997) (noting 
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The feasible alternative test requires the new design to meet five char-
acteristics. First, the new design must be feasible within the state of· 
present technology because we will not ask the defendant manufac-
turer to do that which is impossible. 70 Second, it must be as marketa-
ble as the original version introduced by the defendant, because the 
defendant is in the business of selling products and we do not want to 
impair the defendant's market share.7 1 Third, it cannot impair the 
utility of the product because we do not wish to eliminate the qualities 
that make the product attractive to the consuming public.72 Fourth, it 
must be cost effective because we will not require manufacturers to 
spend themselves into bankruptcy.73 Fifth, it must be safer than the 
that a feasible alternative is a factor in the risk/benefit analysis); Wright v. Grooke 
Group Ltd., 652 r-.i.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa 2002) (adopting the rule that a plaintiff try-
ing to recover under a design-defect theory must prove that an alternative design 
existed); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983) (explain-
ing that one of the factors a jury may consider in a design-defect case is whether a 
safer alternative design was available). But see Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 
92, 96-97 (Minn. 1987) (stating that a plaintiff does not always have to prove the 
existence of a "safer, feasible alternative design as an element of an alleged defective 
product design case"). 
70. See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1105 (Ill. 1997) (noting 
that an alternative design must be practical); Cavanaugh v. Ski! Corp., 751 A.2d 518, 
521 (NJ 2000) (interpreting the state-of~the-art defense under New .Jersey law as not 
requiring an alternative design if the alternative design is not practical); DeWitt v. 
Eveready Battery Co., 550 S.E.2d 511, 518 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting North 
Carolina law to require a practical alternative). But see Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 808 
P.2d 522, 525 (Nev. 1991) (noting that a manufacturer may be held liable for failing 
to include a state-of-the-art safety device that existed at the time of manufacture). 
71. For example, a few states have enacted legislation that requires an alternative 
design to be as marketable as the original defective product. Sep,, e.g., 735 ILL. CoMP. 
STAT. A'\~. 5/2-2104 (West 2003) (an alternative design must not impair "the useful-
ness, desirability, or marketability of the product"); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(a) (1) 
(West 2000) (providing that an alternative design must be practical and must not 
impair "the reasonably anticipated or intended function of the product"); N.C. GEN. 
STAT.§ 99B-6(a) (1) (2003) (stating that an alternative design must be reasonable and 
must not impair "the usefulness, practicality, or desirability of the product"). 
72. See Swix v. Daisy Mfg. Co., 373 F.3d 678, 682-83 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Glit-
tenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) 
(stating that an alternative design must maintain the product's utility); Cota v. Harley-
Davidson, 684 P.2d 888, 890 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (reviewing a witness's testimony, 
which states that the alternative design would have removed the product's defect with-
out encumbering the product's utility). 
73. See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 125 (Cal. 2001) (noting that the 
cost of an alternative design is a factor for a jury to consider when determining 
whether a product was defectively designed); Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 
674 (Ga. 1994) (noting that at some point the benefits of attaining a safer product are 
outweighed by the costs of attainment); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 
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original product because we are seeking to reduce the risk of harm.74 
In a fast food liability case, this would result in a healthier food 
product. 
A short discussion of the elements of the feasible alternative test 
will give us a better understanding of the original question presented 
by this article: whether the alleged fattening nature of the Big Mac 
should be considered defective under products liability law. 
The first element, requiring an alternative design to be within the 
realm of our present technology, is a common-sense rule and when 
limited to the confines of our Big Mac discussion it is an easy one to 
meet. 75 While this may pose serious debate in more complex prod-
ucts, it is not a formidable barrier when considering food. Non-fatten-
ing ingredient<> in this day are not only sought but are easy to 
substitute.76 The solution to a fattening hamburger patty is simple. 
Leaner meat, which is usually meat of a higher grade and a lower fat 
content, would not only be feasible within the state of our present 
S.W.2d 328, 335 (Tex. 1998) (stating that the costs of an alternative design should not 
outweigh its usefulness). 
74. See, e.g., Moore v. ECI Mgmt., 542 S.E.2d 115, 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (stating 
that a safer alternative as a substitute is a factor in determining design-defect); Nissan 
Motor Co. v. Nave, 740 A.2d 102, 118 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (requiring a plaintiff 
to prove a safer alternative design before recovering on a theory of design-defect); 
Tracy v. Cottrell, 524 S.E.2d 879, 893 (W. Va. 1999) (noting that a plaintiff must 
prove that an alternative design existed, was feasible, and was safer than the original 
product). 
75. Food technology is constantly advancing, and companies frequently experi-
ment with alternate product designs as a result. See, e.g., Daniel Kadlec, Chain Rear-
lion: Ruby Tuesday Serves Up Fewer Carf1s, Calories and Fat-ilnd an Annotated Menu That 
Lets You Keep Track, TIME, June 7, 2004, at 99 (stating that McDonald's has cut portion 
sizes, Frito-Lay has reduced the amount of trans fats in its products, and other compa-
nies have been promoting products for a healthier lifestyle); Laura Shapiro, Fake Fat: 
Miracle or Menace? (Olestra), NEWSWEEK, Jan. 8, 1996, at 60 (examining the attempts to 
implement olestra, a calorie-free fat substitute that can be used for hying); Jennifer 
Barrett, Fast Food Need Not Be Fat Food, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 13. 2003, at 73 (explaining the 
steps that some fast-food producers have taken in response to health-conscious 
consumers). 
76. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick &John Skow, Are We Ready for Fat-Free Fat, TIME, 
Jan. 8, 1996, at 53 (explaining that olestra, a new food innovation, is a fat without the 
negative attributes of traditional fat); see also Boyle, supra note 16, at 138 (comment-
ing on the role technology plays in the development of fast food and noting that 
"companies like Procter & Gamble, Tropicana, and others quietly employ [a technol-
ogy company] to take their foods, remove bad stuff like sugar or fat, and then rebuild 
them so that our mouths will never know the difference"). 
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technology, but it would also be easy to acquire and probably health-
ier in the long run. 77 
Meeting the elements of marketability and utility are also easy 
objectives. McDonald's and other fast food purveyors undertake a tre-
mendous amount of market research before introducing a product 
into the stream of commerce.78 Public opinion,79 taste tests,80 and a 
wide variety of market research techniques often play a very large and 
important part in the design of items offered on fast food menus. 
There is little question that fattening foods are often tastier than 
leaner foods. 81 Much has been written on this particular phenome-
non, especially in the area of so-called comfort food,H2 but a solution 
is not impossible.83 Manufacturers have the ability to produce alterna-
tives that are capable of meeting the taste preferences of the consum-
ing public while also being less fattening; with modem technology, 
77. See, e.g., Joanne Silberner, Back to the Meat Counter: Fat Dodgers Can Rejoice in the 
Industry's New Lower-Fat Fntrees, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., May 4, 1992 at 80 (noting 
that food manufacturers who produce ready-to-eat entrees are creating meals using 
much leaner beef). 
78. See, e.g., Jack Hayes, Nutrition Latest T'heme in Disney World Dining, Aro:-.~'s RES-
TAURANT NEws, July 8, 1991, at 1 (contrasting Disney's low-fat menu change with Mc-
Donald's million-dollar advertising blitz upon introducing the McLean Burger). 
79. See, e.g., David Stires, Fal!Rn Arches, FoRTU"F, Apr. 29, 2002, at 75 (explaining 
that McDonald's finished last in a public opinion poll taken in recent years); Fat Na-
tion Fip,hts Back-Sort OJ; U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, July 1, 2002, at 4 (predicting 
that once class-action lawsuits against fast-food giants are initiated, public opinion will 
begin to shift against the fast-food industry, and class-action lawsuits against such fast-
food giants will be more successful). 
80. See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 78 (noting that Disney unveiled its low-fat burger 
after four months of "rigorous taste tests"). 
81. See Lemonick, sujJm note 1, at 67 (explaining that cattle farmers "are raising 
vast herds of cattle whose meat is laden with the fat that makes it taste so good"); 
Boyle, supra note 16, at 136-37 (explaining the failure of recent healthy alternatives to 
traditional fast food and quoting Janice Meyer, a former analyst, who indicates that 
most fast food health alternates failed because the companies were "chasing the nutri-
tional content and not the taste bud"). But see Marjory Roberts, Health Food?, U.S. 
NEws & WoRLD REP., May 20, 1991, at 73 (noting that in a taste test, college students 
found a lower fat version of certain fast foods to be just as palatable as their grease-
laden predecessors). 
82. See Rebecca Oliva, Changing Patterns: Hotel Restaurants Open the Door to New Din-
ing Sty!Rs in Their Markets, HoTELS, May 2004, at 92 (noting that American cheeseburg-
ers, apple pie, meat loaf, and fried chicken are classic American comfort foods). 
83. See Julie Rawe, Snacks Go Low Carb: Atkins Dieters Are Springing for New junk-Food 
Substitutes That-Surprise-Don't Taste Half Bad, Ttl\tE, Aug. 18, 2003, at 47 (noting that 
manufacturers have improved the taste of sugar-free candies over the years); Alex 
Taylor III, Why Du Pont 15 Trading Oil for Corn, FoRTUNE, Apr. 26, 1999, at 158 (ex-
plaining that a new variety of corn used as chicken feed has improved the flavor of 
chicken). 
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manufacturers can easily add spices or other taste-enhancing ele-
ments.~:~4 As a result the marketability, as well as the third element of 
utility, of a less fattening food product would not impair the product 
or in some instances may even improve its desirability. 
Cost is also an important element.85 Our economy is a capitalistic 
one, and we will not force manufacturers into bankruptcy by making 
them meet the requirements of a feasible alternative;86 however, man-
ufacturers use commercial discounts,87 foreign imports,88 outsourc-
ing, 89 and other techniques to reduce the cost of manufacturing every 
84. See, e.g., Native Mushroom Extract Developed, 12 Fooo INGREDIENT NEws, Jan. 1, 
2004, available at 2004 WLNR 6573257 (explaining that "mushroom extract is com-
pletely water-soluble and fat-free and has no enzyme activity. which gives it good shelf 
life. The extract can be used in liquid or powdered forms to improve the taste of 
foods with sensitive fat content (butter fats or creams)."; Exotic Flavor from Cactus/ 
Ginseng Combo, ll Foon INGREDIENT NEws, July 1, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 
6486692 (noting that the combination of cactus and ginseng improves flavor and nu-
tritional value); Fats/Replacements: Low Fat Additives Drive Market, 7 Fooo lNGREDIE"lT 
NEws, Sept. l, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR 3726044 (mentioning a company that 
makes carrageenan and microcrystalline cellulose, which "enhance texture and taste 
in low-fat foods"). 
85. See, e.g., supra note 73 and accompanying text; Hannah v. Gregg, Bland, & 
Berry, Inc., 840 So. 2d 839. 858-60 (Ala. 2002) (including cost in the court's alternate 
design analysis). But see Smith v. Louisville Ladder Co., 237 F.3d 515, 532 (5th Cir. 
2001) (explaining that because of information limitations, "a plaintiff is not required 
to establish with particularity the costs and benefits associated with adoption of the 
suggested alternative design"). 
86. Sw supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
87. Compare Patricia Sellers, The Dumbest Marketing Ploy, FoRTUNE, Oct. 5, 1992, at 
88-89 (explaining that sellers who give mass wholesale discounts mav lose large 
amounts of money in the long run) with Michael Barbero, Retail Falls Short of Projec-
tions, High End Retailers Post Holiday Gains, WAsH. PosT,jan. 7, 2005, at El (discussing 
retailers' reliance on discounts to boost sales during the December holidays). 
88. See Margot Roosevelt, Made in the US.A.: Where Does That Hamburger Corne From? 
Tho.\P Stmwbenies? limerica's Ranchers and Farmers Think You Have a Right to Know, TIME, 
Aug. 9, 2004, at A4 (noting the predominance of imported foods in America, while 
explaining that American farmers and ranchers often suffer from foreign imports of 
beef and produce); Lou Dobbs, Coming UfJ Empty, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Jan. 26, 
2004, at 46 (stating that "our market is flooded with cheap foreign imports while 
consumers who want to buy American-made products often can't even find them"); 
Daren Fonda, Steeling Jobs: America's Ailing Mills Want Another Bailout-With the Cost 
Falling on Companies 17wt Use Steel, TI\1E, Feb. 25, 2002, at B6 (explaining the effect of 
foreign imported steel on U.S. steel mills). 
89. See Lou Dobbs, The Myth of 'Insourcing, 'U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., May 3, 2004, 
at S6 (explaining that future outsourcing ofjobs could lead to the loss of fourteen 
million Americanjobs);Justin Fox, 'Where Your Job Is Going: A Visit to Bangalore, India, a 
City 'Where Tech h Hot, the Drinks Are Cold, Work Is Plentiful, and the Salaries ArP a Lot 
LoweT Than Yours, FoRTU"lE, Nov. 24, 2003, at 84 (highlighting the business aspects of 
outsourcing jobs to low wage earning countries). 
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day. This should not be a formidable obstacle, especially when we 
consider that most additional business costs are passed on to the con-
suming public.90 
The fifth and last element to consider is safety, and in all 
probability, this is the most important element. After all, by requiring 
that a feasible alternative to an existing product be established in or-
der to prove defectiveness, our main objective is to guarantee that ad-
ditional injuries will not be inflicted.Y 1 Unfortunately, this is where 
potential plaintiffs usually encounter their most difficult hurdles. 
Simply stated, how can we consider a food product defective when it 
advertises that billions92 of that food product have been sold to con-
sumers? And how can we find such a food product "unreasonably 
dangerous" as the Restatement requires?93 It is true that a leaner ver-
sion of the Big Mac will be healthier, technologically feasible, cost effi-
cient, and just as marketable and useful as the current version; but will 
it be safer? An affirmative response would imply that the present ver-
sion is dangerous. This is not true. 
Perhaps a comparison to cigarettes should be made at this point. 
There is no question that excessive smoking over an extended period 
of time can be harmful.94 It has been proven that such practice often 
leads to lung cancer, emphysema, heart problems, high blood pres-
sure, and other illnesses.95 The negative consequences of smoking to-
90. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-()9, at 6 (1985) (stating that "[c]onsumers must ulti-
mately bear through higher prices the excessive costs of our product liability system"); 
Anna Bernasek, Will Fhis Recov(~y Run Out Of Gas?, FoRTUNE, May 31, 2004, at 38 
(noting that airlines are able to pass increased fuel prices on to consumers); jill Jor-
dan Sieder, To Catch a Thief, Try This: Peddling High-Tech Solutions to Shoplifting, U.S. 
NEws & WoRLD REP., Sept. 23, 1996, at 71 (noting that retailers pass on the cost of 
shoplifting to consumers). 
91. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
92. See, e.g., Amy Garber, McD Beefs Up Plan to Focus on Core Brand, Eyes Sale of 
Nonburger Chains: Takes 4th-Q Charge of at Least $300M as Company Sets Up Revamp, NA-
TION's REsTAURANT NEws, Jan. 5, 2004, at 4 (stating that McDonald's is eager to main-
tain its recent high-t1ying U.S. sales momentum by focusing its efforts on Big Mac 
advertising). 
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF oR~ 402(A) (1965). 
94. See, e.g., Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and 
Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 
41,314 (Aug. 11, 199!)) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 801,803,804, 897) (listing the 
negative health effects of smoking). The more cigarettes one smokes and the longer 
one smokes, the greater the risks of health problems. !d. 
95. See, e.g., Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 41,314 (listing the negative health consequences of smoking, including cancer of 
the mouth, larynx, and esophagus, pancreatic cancer, kidney cancer, cancer of the 
cervix, stomach cancer, strokes, peptic ulcer disease, infertility, etc.). 
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bacco are widely reported.LJG Nonetheless, notwithstanding its 
addictive nature, some studies have shown that smoking an occasional 
cigarette is not considered deadly,97 and tobacco is not widely consid-
ered a defective product. Just as excessive consumption of alcohol 
may lead to alcoholism98 or injury to the liver,99 the excessive inges-
tion of sugar by a diabetic may prove harmful, 100 or the excessive con-
sumption of laxatives may cause injury,101 excessive consumption of 
Big Macs may also produce undesirable effects. 102 So the primary 
question remains: is the Big Mac defective and unreasonably danger-
ous? The answer must be an emphatic no! In fact, these issues were 
specifically addressed when section 402A of the Restatement (Second) 
96. See, e.g., Matthew Baldini, 17w Cigarette Battl.e: Anti-Smoking Proponents Go for the 
Knockout, 26 SETON HALL L. RE\. 348, 370 (1995) (stating that lung cancer was the 
most prevalent cancer linked to smoking, and noting other smoking related diseases 
such as chronic bronchitis, emphysema, and coronary artery disease);]. Michael Mc-
Ginnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes ofDeath in the United States, 270 JAMA 2207, 
2208-10 (1993) (finding that tobacco use ranks as one of the leading causes of death 
among Americans); Sarah Payne, Smoke Like a Man, Die Like a Man?: A Review of the 
Relationship Between Gendm; Sex and Lung Cancer, Social Sci. & Med., Oct. 15, 2001, at 
1067 (noting that lung cancer from smoking is one of the greatest preventable causes 
of death). Because of the dangers of smoking, a warning label is required on ciga-
rette packages. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). Also, advertising of tobacco products via elec-
tronic media has been banned. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982). 
97. Despite all of the evidence to the contrary, studies have occasionally indicated 
that there may be some health benetlts reaped from smoking. See Peter Brimelow, 
Thank You for Smoking ... ?, FoRBES, July 4, 1994, at 80 (explaining a theory that 
smoking an occasional cigarette reduces the possibility of Parkinson's Disease, 
Alzheimer's Disease, endometrial cancer, prostate cancer, osteoarthritis, and colon 
cancer). 
98. See MayoClinic.com, Alcoholism, at http:/ /www.mayoclinic.com/invoke.cfin?id= 
DS00340 (last visited Feb. 21, 2005) (explaining that alcoholism, which is usually asso-
ciated with physical dependence on alcohol but may also be the result of genetic, 
psychological and social factors, is often a progressive disease which involves preoccu-
pation with alcohol and impaired control over the consumption of alcohol). 
99. See id. (stating that years of drinking heavily may lead to cirrhosis). 
100. See RobertS. Dinsmoor, Diabetes: Lifting the Sugar Embargo, HARV. HEALTH LET-
TER, Oct. 1994, at 7 (explaining that high consumption of sugar by diabetics can lead 
to an increase in glucose levels, which can be debilitating and even fatal). 
101. See Ara DerMarderosian & Sharon M. Brudnicki, The Misuse and Abuse of OTC 
Laxatives, Ai\1. DRuGGIST, jan. 1996, at 49 (noting that laxatives are commonly used to 
treat constipation, yet laxative use can lead to disorders); Paula Kurtzweil, Dieter's 
Brews Make Tea Time a Dangerous Affair: Slim Chance of Weight Loss with These He-rbal 
Drinks, FDA CoNSUMER, July 17, 1997, at 9 (noting that the abuse of laxatives can 
cause diarrhea, vomiting, nausea, stomach cramps, chronic constipation, fainting, 
and even death). 
102. See, e.g., ScHLOSSER, supra note 14, at 239-43 (connecting the regular consump-
tion of fast food products with a wide variety of health problems). 
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of Torts was adopted. 10 '~ The Comments were good law then andre-
main good law today_I04 
The most that can be said is that there may be a duty of disclo-
sure. As mentioned above, other products have followed this path. A 
fair, honest, and conspicuous statement with regard to the contents of 
the Big Mac, including calorie content, would certainly place the con-
sumer on notice. Mter that, as with many other products for use or 
consumption, the choice would belong to the individual. 
No product is technologically perfect, and any product can cause 
i~ury. Overeating, as with excessive smoking or drinking, produces 
negative results. This logic is certainly applicable to the Big Mac, but 
it could never be maintained that the Big Mac is defective. 
III. CoNCLUSION 
There is no question that Americans are growing more con-
cerned about their weight. While there was no intention to single out 
the Big Mac as the ultimate culprit, there is little question that it is the 
definitive icon of fast food consumption. Using it as such, an attempt 
has been made to determine whether fast food is or should be consid-
ered defective under products liability law. This discussion of the vari-
ous elements has suggested that fast food, however fattening, cannot 
be considered defective under products liability law. 
103. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A cmt. j (1965) (stating that "a 
seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in them, which 
are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive quantity, or over a 
long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known 
and recognized" and "the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an example, as are also 
those of foods containing such substances as saturated fat~, which may over a period 
of time have a deleterious effect upon the human heart"). 
104. See id.; Strong v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 
1981) (noting that comment j does not impose upon manufacturers a duty to warn 
consumers of a product's potential dangers when the consumers know or should 
know of the potential dangers); Guilbeault v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 84 F. Supp. 
2d 263, 269-70 (D. R.I. 2000) (noting that commentj shields sellers from liability for 
failing to warn consumers of potential dangers); see also Schmidt v. Centex Beverage, 
Inc., 825 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. App. 1992) (applying comment j and finding that 
manufacturers do not have a duty to warn consumers of the dangers of driving while 
intoxicated). 
